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I. INTRODUCTION 
It was Labor Day weekend and a popular high school girl’s parents were 
going to be out of town.1 The absence of parental supervision provided the ideal 
venue for reckless teenage behavior and underage alcohol use.2 Late that 
evening—unconscious from excessive alcohol consumption—Audrie Pott lay 
defenseless as three boys defaced her body with pens and penetrated her with 
their fingers while taking photographs with their phones.3 The boys shared the 
photographs with classmates, rumors were spread, and a seemingly permanent 
 
1. See Nina Burleigh, Sexting, Shame, and Suicide, ROLLING STONE (Sept. 17, 2013), available at 
http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/news/sexting-shame-and-suicide-20130917 (on file with the McGeorge 
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digital record of Audrie’s sexual assault was exposed.4 Nine days later, Audrie 
Pott hung herself.5 
The three boys admitted to the felony sex crimes.6 However, two of the three 
received just 30-day sentences and the other was sentenced to 45 days.7 Since 
these convictions, two of the three juveniles have reoffended, committing similar 
crimes.8 The boys avoided harsher penalties—up to ten years in prison—under a 
California statute permitting the State to try minors over 14 as adults for forcible 
sexual assaults only.9 Sexual assaults against “defenseless victims” do not fall 
under the purview of that statute.10 The law’s different treatment of forcible rape 
and sex crimes against defenseless victims was the impetus for Chapter 919.11 
However, Chapter 919 fails to resolve this disparity meaningfully and instead, 
when minors are accused of a sex crime against a defenseless victim, merely 
grants the public greater access to juvenile proceedings, requires these minors to 
attend sex offender treatment programs, and bars them from receiving a deferred 
entry of judgment.12  
 
4. See Jessica Calefati, Audrie Pott Case: Sex Assault Bill Named for Saratoga Teen Moves Forward, 
SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Apr. 29, 2014), available at http://www.mercurynews.com/california/ci_25660 
180/sex-assault-bill-named-saratoga-teen-clears-state (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (reporting that 
Audrie Pott relived the sexual assault over and over through digital images of the crime that circulated amongst 
the social circle). 
5. Burleigh, supra note 1. 
6. See Khalida Sarwari, Criminal Trial Result Brings Some Closure for the Pott Family, SAN JOSE 
MERCURY NEWS (Jan. 29, 2014), available at http://www.mercurynews.com/saratoga/ci_25022538/criminal-
trial-result-brings-some-closure-pott-family (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (reporting that the three 
accused teenagers each plead guilty to various felonies). 
7. Id. 
8. Enya Kuo, Proposed ‘Audrie’s Law’ Ignites New Debate Over Juvenile Justice Sentences, SAN JOSE 
MERCURY NEWS (June 26, 2014), available at http://www.mercurynews.com/ci_26040672/proposed-audries-
law-ignites-new-debate-over-juvenile (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (reporting that two of the three 
boys involved in the sexual assault of Audrie Pott have reoffended since being adjudicated). 
9. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707 (West 2014) (enumerating serious violent crimes that enable the 
court to try juvenile offenders as adults, which does not include sex crimes against defenseless victims); Juliea 
Prodis Sulek, Audrie Pott: Boys Admit Sexually Assaulting Saratoga Teen Who Committed Suicide, SAN JOSE 
MERCURY NEWS (Jan. 14, 2014), available at http://www.mercurynews.com/crime-courts/ci_24913018/audrie-
pott-boys-admit-sexually-assaulting-saratoga-teen (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
10. Burleigh, supra note 1; WELF. & INST. § 676(a)(4)–(6) (amended by Chapter 919) (A defenseless 
victim” is a “person is prevented from resisting due to being rendered unconscious by any intoxicating, 
anesthetizing, or controlled substance, or when the victim is at the time incapable, because of a disability, of 
giving consent, and this is known or reasonably should be known to the person committing the offense.”). 
11. See Calefati, supra note 4 (indicating the outrage that compelled supporters of the law to seek equal 
treatment for sexual assault victims regardless of whether the victim was unconscious or not). 
12.  See WELF. & INST. § 707 (enumerating serious violent crimes that provide the petitioner and court the 
opportunity to require the offending juvenile be tried in adult criminal court, which carries severe punishments 
rather than a rehabilitative probation available in juvenile court, but does not, even after Chapter 919, include 
sex crimes against defenseless victims); David Finkelhor, Richard Ormrod, & Mark Chaffin, Juveniles who 
Commit Sex Offenses Against Minors, JUVENILE JUSTICE BULLETIN (Dec. 2009), at 1, 4, available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ ojjdp/227763.pdf  (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (indicating the 
difference between ‘forcible’ and ‘not forcible’ in the context of sex offenses). 
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
California law treats juveniles fundamentally differently than adults.13 Unlike 
the adult criminal justice system, California’s juvenile justice system focuses on 
the offender and rehabilitation, not the offense and punishment.14 However, when 
minors commit multiple felonies or certain violent crimes even the juvenile 
justice system favors punitive measures over rehabilitation.15 
Upon committing a crime, a minor becomes a ward of the court and subject 
to its jurisdiction.16 A court then maintains broad control over the proceedings, 
including the determination of the confidentiality of the proceedings and the 
resolution of the matter.17 While a juvenile adjudication is not supposed to hinder 
the juvenile later in life,18 there are circumstances where a sustained petition19 can 
haunt the juvenile into adulthood.20 
Building on legislation that allowed minors as young as 14 to be tried as 
adults in some cases,21 Proposition 21 lowered the eligible age from 16 to 14 for a 
variety of criminal penalty enhancers.22 Proposition 21 promulgated a punitive 
approach to violent juvenile crime by: (1) requiring more juvenile offenders to be 
tried in adult courts; (2) mandating that certain juvenile offenders be incarcerated 
in local or state correctional facilities; and (3) expanding the list of violent and 
serious offenses that qualify for longer sentences.23 Proposition 21 also continued 
 
13. See How Does California’s Juvenile Justice System Work?, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, May 
1995, at 1, available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/1995/050195_juv_crime/kkpart5.aspx (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review) (indicating that California’s adult system is premised on punishment while California’s 
juvenile system is premised on treatment and rehabilitation). 
14. See WELF. & INST. § 202 (West 2008) (describing the juvenile justice system’s goal of rehabilitation 
“appropriate for their circumstances.”); HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
JUVENILE JUSTICE, 86 (1999), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/nationalreport99/chapter4.pdf (on 
file with the McGeorge Law Review) (explaining the history and philosophy of the juvenile justice system). 
15. See LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, PROPOSITION 21, 1 (March 21, 2000), available at http://www. 
lao.ca.gov/ballot/2000/21_03_2000.html. 
16. See WELF. & INST. § 601. 
17. See id. §§ 676(a), 730(a)–(b), 790 (outlining the court’s jurisdiction over the minor with regard to 
confidentiality of the proceedings, the types of rehabilitation of the ward, and determination if a minor is 
eligible for deferred entry of judgment). 
18. See id. § 203 (“An order adjudging a minor to be a ward of the juvenile court shall not be deemed a 
conviction of a crime for any purpose, nor shall a proceeding in the juvenile court be deemed a criminal 
proceeding.”). 
19. Id. § 726(d). 
20. See PENAL § 290.008(a)–(c)  (defining the offenses juveniles are required to register as sex offenders 
upon release from the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice). 
21. JENNIFER LYNN-WHALEY & ANDREA RUSSI, U. OF CAL., BERKELEY L. SCH., IMPROVING JUVENILE 
JUSTICE POLICY IN CALIFORNIA: A CLOSER LOOK AT TRANSFER LAWS’ IMPACT ON YOUNG MEN & BOYS OF 
COLOR 3 (2011), available at https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/BMOC_Brief_Juvenile_Justice_CA_final.pdf 
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
22. Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act of 1998, Proposition 21 §§ 18, 26 (Cal. 2000). 
23. Id. 
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the current practice of only lifting the confidentiality of juvenile proceedings 
when certain enumerated offenses were alleged.24 
Absent a request from the accused minor, juvenile court hearings are closed 
to the public.25 However, hearings involving allegations of a murder, armed 
robbery, torture, and some kidnappings, burglaries, arsons, and assaults are open 
to the public.26 While hearings regarding forceful and violent sex crimes are also 
largely open to the public, the court can protect the victim’s testimony from the 
public at the request of the district attorney or if the victim was under 16.27 
Juvenile courts have retained the ability to determine what reasonable 
conditions are necessary to help reform and rehabilitate juveniles, including those 
juveniles who have committed sex crimes.28 This discretion enables juvenile 
courts to send minors to various educational and treatment programs, including 
youth ranches and forestry camps.29 
Deferred entry of judgment (DEJ) provides a way for minors to admit to the 
charged offense and avoid the entry of an adverse judgment on the petition, 
providing they successfully complete the prescribed probation.30 While DEJ is 
unavailable to minors accused of forceful sex crimes and other violent crimes, it 
was available to sex crimes committed against defenseless victims.31 
III. CHAPTER 919 
Chapter 919 amends existing law to impose more significant consequences 
on juveniles who commit sex crimes against “defenseless victims.”32 First, 
Chapter 919 enables the public to access juvenile proceedings involving sex 
crimes against defenseless victims, while maintaining the prior safeguards to 
protect victim anonymity.33 Second, Chapter 919 requires mandatory sex offender 
treatment for minors adjudicated of sex crimes, including sex crimes against 
 
24. Id. § 31. 
25.  WELF. & INST. § 676(a) (West 2008). 
26. Id. 
27. Id. § 676(b) (“[M]embers of the public shall not be admitted to the hearing in either of the following 
instances: (1) Upon a motion for a closed hearing by the district attorney, who shall make the motion if so 
requested by the victim; (2) During the victim’s testimony, if, at the time of the offense the victim was under 16 
years of age.”) 
28. See Id. § 730(a)–(b) (describing the autonomy given to the juvenile court to prescribe rehabilitative 
probation to the juvenile). 
29. Id. § 730(a)–(c). 
30. See id. §§ 790–795 (demonstrating the eligibility, procedure, terms and conditions, and official 
oversight regarding deferred entry of judgment). 
31. Id. § 790(a)(2). 
32. See id. §§ 676(a)(4)–(6), 730, 790 (amended by Chapter 919). 
33. Id. § 676 (amended by Chapter 919). 
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defenseless victims.34 Third, Chapter 919 removes the opportunity for minors 
accused of sex crimes against defenseless victims to receive DEJ.35 
IV. ANALYSIS 
Sexual assault by juveniles is a serious problem, accounting for more than 
one-third of all sexual offenses against minors.36 However, Chapter 919’s 
approach largely overrides the juvenile justice system’s goal to rehabilitate the 
offending juvenile and instead provides the victim of the sex crime reassurance 
that the proceedings against the accused will be subjected to greater public 
scrutiny.37 While intended to increase the punishment for sex crimes against 
defenseless victims,38 Chapter 919 presents a host unintended consequences.39 
Part A of this section discusses how the elimination of the possibility for DEJ 
and making the hearings public fail to serve the rehabilitative goals of the 
juvenile justice system and force victims to relive their trauma.40 Part B describes 
the potential legal challenges that may stem from public access to juvenile court 
proceedings for sex crimes against defenseless victims.41 Part C discusses 
Chapter 919’s rehabilitative goal as it is furthered by mandatory sex offender 
treatment for minors adjudicated of sex crimes.42  
A. Chapter 919 Harms Both Minors Accused of Rape of a Defenseless Victim 
and the Victim Himself or Herself 
Chapter 919 forecloses DEJ to minors charged with sex crimes against 
defenseless victims.43 This provides victims with assurances that those accused 
 
34. See id. § 730(d) (amended by Chapter 919). 
35. See id. § 790(a)(7)  (as amended by Chapter 919). 
36. Finkelhor, supra note 12, at 3 (indicating the statistics relating to the substantial portion of sex 
offenses committed by juveniles). 
37. See WELF. & INST. § 202 (outlining the rehabilitative objective of the juvenile justice system); id. at § 
676 (amended by Chapter 919) (allowing public access to juvenile proceedings for sex crimes against 
defenseless victims); id. at § 790 (amended by Chapter 919) (denying deferred entry judgment to the accused 
which requires the juvenile delinquency process to proceed through the formal trial process). 
38. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 838, at 4 (June 17, 
2014) (stating that Audrie’s Law would create “stiffer penalties for juveniles who sexually assault a 
developmentally disabled or unconscious victim”). 
39. See discussion infra Part IV.A–C. 
40. See infra Section IV Part A. 
41. See infra Section IV Part B. 
42. See infra Section IV Part C. 
43. Id. § 790 (as amended by Chapter 919). 
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minors may face greater public scrutiny,44 straying from the rehabilitative roots of 
the juvenile justice system.45 
Under Chapter 919, the option to avoid potentially lengthy proceedings by 
allowing the juvenile to admit responsibility for committing a sex crime against a 
defenseless victim and willingly accept court ordered probation.46 Instead, the 
adjudication will now proceed when the prosecutor or probation department files 
a petition indicating the accused juvenile committed a sex crime against a 
defenseless victim.47 The matter then advances to a jurisdictional hearing,48 when 
the judge may decide there is potentially enough evidence to prove the juvenile 
committed the crime, the adjudication moves to the disposition hearing.49 These 
hearings, under Chapter 919, will all be open to the public.50 Normally the option 
for DEJ is offered to qualifying juveniles before or just after the attorney files the 
petition,51 however, there is no option for DEJ under Chapter 919 for sex crimes 
committed against defenseless victims.52 
Absent DEJ, the time from arrest to a court appearance can be a matter days 
if the minor is currently in custody, or weeks if not.53 Attorneys may continue 
hearings for several weeks while attempting to negotiate a favorable resolution.54 
Not only does this extend the amount of time the victim must endure the 
 
44. See id. (indicating that DEJ will not be available and the matter will proceed to trial absent a plea); 
CAL. R. CT. 5.534 (West Supp. 2014) (indicating the general provisions of the juvenile proceedings including 
control, conduct, and burden of proof requirements). 
45. See WELF. & INST. § 202 (describing the juvenile justice system’s goal of rehabilitation “appropriate 
for their circumstances”); SNYDER, supra note 14, at 86 (explaining the history and philosophy of the juvenile 
justice system). 
46. See WELF. & INST. § 790 (amended by Chapter 919) (denying DEJ for juveniles accused of sex crimes 
against defenseless victims). 
47. See id. § 630 (West 2008) (establishing the procedure associated with filing a petition against the 
juvenile, notice of the hearing, and the privileges and rights of the juvenile); CALIFORNIA COURTS, THE JUD. 
BRANCH OF CAL., GUIDE TO JUVENILE COURT, available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/1216.htm?print=1 
(defining instances in which juvenile petitions are filed). 
48. See CALIFORNIA COURTS, supra note 47 (explaining the procedure California courts follow after a 
petition is filed, in that a jurisdiction hearing is where a judge decides whether or not the juvenile is guilty). 
49. See id. (explaining the options available to the judge for the disposition hearing). 
50. WELF. & INST. § 676(b) (amended by Chapter 919). 
51. See CAL. R. CT. 5.800 (West Supp. 2014) (defining the procedure followed by the court for making 
juveniles eligible for deferred entry of judgment). 
52. See WELF. & INST. § 790 (amended by Chapter 919) (forbidding deferred entry of judgment for 
juveniles that commit sex crimes against defenseless victims). 
53. See id. § 657(a) (West 2008) (stating that upon filing a petition, the court shall set the hearing within 
30 days unless the minor is in custody, at which time the hearing must be within 15 days of the detention); 
JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., CALIFORNIA JUVENILE COURT PROCESS FOR DELINQUENCY CASES 3 (2009), 
available at http://www.pjdc.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/Fact-Sheet-for-Upload-Juvenile-Court-
Process.pdf [hereinafter COURT PROCESS FOR DELINQUENCY CASES]  (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) 
(pointing out that juvenile justice cases may occur within five or six weeks of initial contact with law 
enforcement, but in practice may take longer due to continuances or delays in placement). 
54. See COURT PROCESS FOR DELINQUENCY CASES, supra note 53, at 2 (explaining the options available 
to the accused, including denial and motions for appointment of experts, all of which tack time onto the 
proceeding). 
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proceedings, but it also lengthens the time between the minor’s offending 
behavior and the consequences for it.55 Rather than adhering to the principles of 
rehabilitation underlying the current juvenile justice system,56 Chapter 919 
punishes minors accused of sex crimes against defenseless victims by ensuring 
they experience greater publicity then they would under prior law.57 Furthermore, 
this extends the period for which victims must wait for a resolution and increases 
the likelihood that they will need to testify, expounding the trauma of the 
incident.58 
DEJ hold juvenile offenders accountable and is only offered to statutorily 
eligible juveniles whom the court determines will benefit from the opportunity.59 
Before the juvenile is given the opportunity for DEJ, a prosecutor decides 
whether the minor is statutorily eligible and then requires him to admit to the 
offense and demonstrate a willingness to cooperate with the probation.60 When 
the accused meets the statutory requirements for DEJ, the court decides whether 
or not he or she will receive the benefits of DEJ, taking into account his or her 
“age, maturity, education, family relationships, level of motivation, and treatment 
history.”61 Juveniles cannot contest any allegation in the petition in order to 
remain eligible for DEJ.62 A swift process, when a minor can make immediate 
admissions and there are no potential continuances, benefits his or her 
rehabilitation.63 Additionally, a speedy process assists victims who want 
 
55. See Megan Kurlychek, Patricia Torbet & Melanie Bozynski, Focus on Accountability: Best Practices 
for Juvenile Court and Probation, JAIBG BULLETIN, Aug. 1999, at 1 (identifying swift application of 
consequences to reduce further law violations). 
56. See Jennifer Taylor, Note, California’s Proposition 21: A Case of Juvenile Injustice, S. CAL. L. REV. 
983, 986 (2002) (describing the underlying rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile justice system in California). 
57. See WELF. & INST. § 790 (amended by Chapter 919) (withholding availability of deferred entry of 
judgment from juveniles accused of sex crimes against defenseless victims); see also id. § 676 (amended by 
Chapter 919) (allowing for juvenile proceedings regarding sex crimes against defenseless victims to be opened 
to the public). 
58. SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, UNFINISHED BUSINESS at 5 (Aug. 8, 2014) (argument in opposition). 
59. See WELF. & INST. §§ 790, 791(6)(b) (outlining the eligibility requirements for juveniles to be offered 
DEJ as well as the accountability requirements that accompany the opportunity). 
60. Id. 
61. Id. § 791 (providing for an investigation by the probation department to determine whether the minor 
“is a person who would be benefitted by education, treatment, or rehabilitation”); see CAL. R. CT. 5.800 (West 
Supp. 2014) (defining the procedure followed by the court for instances of juveniles eligible for deferred entry 
of judgment); Martha C. v. Sup. Ct., 108 Cal. App. 4th 556, 561, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d 544, 547 (4th Dist. 2003) 
(finding it important for the trial court to look at whether or not the juvenile could benefit from or be 
rehabilitated by deferred entry of judgment). 
62. See In re T.J., 185 Cal. App. 4th 1504, 1511, 111 Cal. Rptr. 3d 298, 301 (3d Dist. 2010) (“If the minor 
elects to contest some allegations but not others, or to contest an element of an allegation but not others, the 
statutory scheme does not entitle the minor to DEJ.”). 
63. See David E. Arrendondo, M.D., Child Development, Children’s Mental Health and the Juvenile 
Justice System: Principles for Effective Decision-Making, 14.1 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 13, 16 (2003) (“From a 
child development perspective, the predictability and consistency . . . is often what is most important. If a child 
learns that his social environment will respond inconsistently, he is much more likely to continue a behavior in 
the hopes that he will ‘get away with it this time.”). 
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resolution and closure, rather than ongoing court hearings that draw out the 
process.64 
DEJ also requires buy-in from the juvenile, his or her family, the prosecutor, 
the defense attorney, the probation officer, and the court.65 DEJ increases the 
juvenile’s chances of success through collaboration of the juvenile’s family or 
guardians and court representatives in the rehabilitation effort.66 However, the 
prosecutor or probation officer has the ultimate discretion whether or not the 
juvenile is “performing satisfactorily,” further motivating the juvenile to 
complete the probation successfully so the court does not lift the deferral and 
enter judgment for the crime committed.67 
The adverse effect a juvenile criminal record has on future employment, 
eligibility for state licenses, qualifications for loans, and housing applications 
may be eliminated once a minor’s record becomes sealed ifthe requirements of 
the DEJ and other requirements are met.68 When the court grants a petition to seal 
a juvenile’s criminal record, it closes the file so that the documents containing 
any convictions essentially cease to exist,69 thus alleviating further stigmatization 
of a former juvenile offender.70 
The act of sealing a juvenile’s record for sex crimes against defenseless 
victims is made possible because Chapter 919 failed to include sex crimes against 
defenseless victims among the serious crimes for which a minor can be tried as 
 
64. See Mark S. Umbreit, Restorative Justice Through Victim-Offender Mediation: A Multi-Site 
Assessment, 1 W. CRIMINOLOGY REV. 1, 3 (1998), available at http://wcr.sonoma.edu/v1n1/umbreit.html (on 
file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating that absent an offender’s accountability, victims generally feel 
twice victimized, first by the offender, and second by the criminal justice system). 
65. See R. CT. 5.800 (defining the procedure followed by the court for instances of juveniles eligible for 
deferred entry of judgment); Martha C., 108 Cal. App. 4th at 561, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 547 (finding it important 
for the trial court to look at whether or not the juvenile could benefit from or be rehabilitated by deferred entry 
of judgment); see also WELF. & INST. § 791 (providing for an investigation by the probation department to 
determine whether the minor “is a person who would be benefitted by education, treatment, or rehabilitation”). 
66. See CAL. R. CT. 5.800 (requiring the court to conduct a progress hearing to determine whether or not 
the juvenile has satisfactorily completed the probation); U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER 
MGMT., UNDERSTANDING JUVENILE SEXUAL OFFENDING BEHAVIOR: EMERGING RESEARCH, TREATMENT 
APPROACHES AND MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 6, (Dec. 1999) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING JUVENILE SEXUAL 
OFFENDING BEHAVIOR] (indicating a correlation between willingness to participate in deferred entry of 
judgment and successful completion of the ordered probation). 
67. See WELF. & INST. § 793(a) (stating that the court “shall lift the deferred entry of judgment and 
schedule a dispositional hearing”). 
68. See id. § 781 (setting forth that a juvenile that “has not been convicted of a felony or of any 
misdemeanor involving moral turpitude and that rehabilitation has been attained to the satisfaction of the court” 
may have his criminal record sealed, effectively shielding its contents to virtually anyone wishing to access it). 
69. In re James H., 154 Cal. App. 4th 1078, 1088, 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 410 (1st Dist. 2007) (holding that a 
juvenile court exceeded its authority when it provided the parole board with copies of records that it had 
previously ordered sealed, furthering the notion that once juvenile records are sealed, they are virtually 
unreachable). 
70. See Taylor, supra note 56, at 985 (stating that the purpose of the juvenile justice system is to 
rehabilitate the juvenile by providing individualized assessments to prevent further delinquent behavior through 
educational, vocational, social, and emotional skills). 
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an adult.71 The omission signifies that sex crimes against defenseless victims are 
not yet considered to be among the most serious types of offenses that require 
adult criminal jurisdiction.72 This distinction is important because a juvenile who 
has been convicted of an offense that was statutorily required to be within adult 
criminal court jurisdiction is ineligible for both DEJ as well as having their 
juvenile record sealed.73 Chapter 919 merely takes the rehabilitative option of 
DEJ away and increases public access to the proceedings, while leaving open the 
opportunity to seal the juvenile’s record.74 
While acknowledging that sex crimes against defenseless victims are serious, 
the law appears to treat these as less serious than forcible sex crimes.75 Because 
defenseless victims are incapacitated, legally the perpetrator has not used force, 
keeping the offending juvenile beyond the reach of a waiver of juvenile 
jurisdiction.76 This enables offending juveniles to continue to avoid the punitive 
punishments available through the adult criminal system for sex crimes against 
defenseless victims;77 however, under Chapter 919 both the accused and the 
victim are subjected to the public and endure a longer process, much like in an 
adult criminal proceeding.78 
 
71. See S.B. 838, 2013–2014 Sess. (Cal. 2014) (demonstrating that sex crimes against defenseless victims 
do not allow the juvenile court to waive jurisdiction to allow jurisdiction of the adult criminal court, rather it 
merely allows public access to the proceedings, takes away deferred entry of judgment, and forces sex offender 
treatment). 
72. See WELF. & INST. § 707(b) (including offenses of murder, arson, robbery, rape with force, and 
kidnapping). 
73. See id. § 781(a) (noting that offenses enumerated in subsection (b) of section 707 of the Welfare and 
Institutions Code are not eligible for sealing). 
74. See id. § 790 (as amended by Chapter 919) (denying eligibility for DEJ for juveniles accused of sex 
crimes against defenseless victims); id. § 781 (setting forth that a juvenile that “has not been convicted of a 
felony or of any misdemeanor involving moral turpitude and that rehabilitation has been attained to the 
satisfaction of the court” may have his criminal record sealed, effectively shielding its contents to virtually 
anyone wishing to access it). 
75. Compare id. § 676(a)(4)–(6), (b) (amended by Chapter 919) (equating a sex crime against a 
defenseless victim the same as a  forcible sex crime for  the purposes of the confidentiality of the hearing), and 
id. § 730 (amended by Chapter 919) (equating a sex crime against a defenseless victim the same as a  forcible 
sex crime for  the purposes of mandatory sex offender treatment), with id. § 602 (requiring a sex crime be 
committed using force to try the minor as an adult). 
76. See id. (defining violent sex crimes which the juvenile court may waive its jurisdiction as crimes 
committed with “force”). 
77. See id. (demonstrating that sex crimes against defenseless victims are not included in the crimes that 
make the juvenile eligible for adult criminal court jurisdiction); PENAL § 264 (defining the punishments for 
forcible rape which range from seven years to thirteen years of confinement). 
78. See generally COURT PROCESS FOR DELINQUENCY CASES, supra note 53, at 3–4  (describing the 
juvenile delinquency hearing procedure which includes appointment of an attorney, presentation of evidence, 
and reading of the court’s disposition); How Criminal Cases Work, CAL. CTS., http://www.courts.ca.gov/ 
1069.htm?print=1 (last visited Aug. 18, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing the adult 
criminal court procedure which includes appointment of an attorney, presentation of evidence, and reading of 
the verdict). 
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DEJ gives some first-time felony offenders the opportunity to have their 
cases dealt with quickly,79 providing accountability and rehabilitation without the 
consequences of a criminal record.80 Chapter 919 abolishes this rehabilitative tool 
for juveniles adjudicated of sex crimes against defenseless victims and increases 
the publicity that the accused and victims may face.81 
B. Constitutional Issues with Public Juvenile Proceedings 
Chapter 919 provides the public access to juvenile proceedings for sex 
crimes against defenseless victims, which may raise constitutional issues.82 The 
U.S. Supreme Court emphasized that a juvenile’s loss of liberty requires due 
process.83 Constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection apply in 
juvenile delinquency hearings.84 However, juveniles are not afforded all of the 
rights available to adults in criminal cases.85 Courts conduct juvenile proceedings 
with the underlying objectives of guiding and rehabilitating the child and thereby 
protecting society, not applying criminal punishment to the child.86 Because 
juvenile proceedings are civil in nature and not criminal, the juvenile can only 
claim the fundamental due process right of fair treatment.87  
The public also has a first amendment right to attend criminal trials.88 This 
right is qualified and a showing of a compelling state interest may overcome it.89 
 
79. See id. § 790 (excluding minors previously declared ward of the court for commission of felony 
offense and specific violent felonies, thus only available for first time juvenile felons). 
80. See id. § 793(c) (indicating that upon successful completion of the probation “the arrest upon which 
the judgment was deferred shall be deemed never to have occurred”). 
81. See id. § 676 (as amended by Chapter 919) (denying deferred entry of judgment for juveniles accused 
of sex crimes against defenseless victims). 
82. San Bernardino Cnty. Dept. of Pub. Soc. Servs. v. Sup. Ct., 232 Cal. App. 3d 188, 195 n.4 (4th Dist. 
1991) (“If public access to juvenile court proceedings is a constitutionally protected right, the juvenile court . . . 
must comply with the United States Supreme Court decisions which hold that the court cannot exclude the 
public absent a showing of overriding compelling state interest and that any order of exclusion would be 
required to be narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”). 
83. See In re Gault 387 U.S. 1, 78 (1967) (holding that juveniles are entitled to: (1) adequate and timely 
notice of charges; (2) legal counsel; (3) confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses; and (4) the privilege 
against self-incrimination); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (holding that guilt be established by proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt in juvenile proceedings); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 526 (1975) (holding that the 
Double Jeopardy Clause is “is fully applicable to juvenile court proceedings”). 
84. See id. at 13 (explaining that “neither the Fourteenth Amendment or the Bill of Rights is for adults 
alone”). 
85. See Kent v. U.S., 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966) (holding that juveniles are “not entitled to bail; to 
indictment by grand jury; to a speedy and public trial; [or] to trial by jury”). 
86. See Joel F. Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems of Function and Form, 
1965 WIS. L. REV. 7, 10 (positing that the State is the parens patriae rather than prosecuting attorney and 
judge). 
87. See Pee v. U.S., 274 F.2d 556, 559 (1959) (holding that the constitutional safeguards are determined 
“from the requirements of due process and fair treatment and not by direct application of clauses of the 
Constitution which in terms apply to criminal cases”). 
88. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980). 
89. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct., 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984) (holding that the public can only be 
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For example, a statute that mandates closed proceedings for the testimony of 
minor victims in criminal trials involving sex offenses is unconstitutional.90 The 
reason why mandatory closure is unconstitutional is that while a state has a 
compelling interest in “safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being 
of a minor,” the mandate is not narrowly tailored to serve the interest.91 Thus, the 
court must look at each case individually to decide whether to deny access to 
criminal proceedings.92 
Here, Chapter 919 gives the victim the option to close juvenile hearings at 
the prosecutor’s request—who shall make the motion if so requested by the 
victim or during the victim’s testimony, if the crime occurred while the victim 
was under 16 years old.93 Because the closure is at the option of the victim, 
Chapter 919 is not overly broad in that not all proceedings involving victims of 
sex crimes are to be closed.94 Further, California has exhibited a compelling 
interest in juveniles under 16 years of age.95  
Meanwhile, Chapter 919 admits the public to hearings containing the 
accused’s testimony regarding a sex crime committed against a defenseless 
victim.96 Admitting the public to the otherwise closed juvenile hearing may 
compromise the accused’s fundamental due process right to fairness.97 Thus, 
excluding the public during the victim’s testimony will be fair only if the state 
shows its interest justifies closure.98 Because Chapter 919 potentially infringes on 
a constitutional right, the accused is not required to show prejudice; he or she 
 
barred from criminal trials when there is “a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to 
service that interest”). 
90. See San Bernardino Cnty. Dept. of Pub. Soc. Servs. v. Super. Ct., 232 Cal. App. 3d 188, 196, 283 Cal. 
Rptr. 332 (4th Dist. 1991) (indicating that a state statute mandating testimony of minor victims of sex crimes be 
taken in closed proceedings has been deemed unconstitutional). 
91. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 607, 609 (1982) (stating that the mandatory 
closure statute was not narrowly tailored to serve a governmental interest because it required closed proceedings 
even in instances when it was unnecessary to protect the well-being of the minor victim). 
92. See San Bernadino Cnty. Dept. of Pub. Soc. Servs., 232 Cal. App. 3d at 196, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 332 
(holding that the issue of access is determined on a case-by-case basis). 
93. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 676 (as amended by Chapter 919). 
94. Id.; see San Bernadino Cnty. Dept. of Pub. Soc. Servs., 232 Cal. App. 3d at 196, 283 Cal. Rptr. 332 
(indicating that a state statute mandating testimony of all minor victims of sex crimes be taken in closed 
proceedings has been deemed unconstitutional). 
95. See PENAL § 859.1 (protecting testimony of a minor under the age of 16 from testifying in a criminal 
proceeding); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982) (holding that “the protection of 
minor victims of sex crimes from further trauma and embarrassment” is a compelling interest). 
96. WELF. & INST. § 676 (as amended by Chapter 919). 
97. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) (holding that the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires that juvenile court delinquency hearings measure up to essentials of due process and fair 
treatment); L.A. Times v. Sup. Ct., 114 Cal. App. 4th 247, 250, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 524, 525 (2d Dist. 2003) 
(holding that based on the assurance of fairness “the right to open public trial is a shared right of the accused 
and the public”). When read together, these decisions indicate that due to Chapter 919’s requirement that 
juvenile proceedings for sex crimes against defenseless victims be opened to the public, a right is created in the 
accused. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 30; L.A. Times, 114 Cal. App. 4th at 250, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 524 at 525. 
98. See Kent v. U.S., 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966) (stating that juvenile adjudications “must measure up to 
the essentials of due process and fair treatment”). 
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must only prove that the right has been violated.99 Therefore, Chapter 919 may 
provide an opportunity for the accused to challenge the legitimacy of the state’s 
interest in maintaining an open proceeding while closing the proceeding for the 
victim.100 
C. Mandatory Sex Offender Treatment Program 
Chapter 919 usurps the judge’s broad discretion in the juvenile justice system 
by requiring minors adjudged or continued as a ward of the court for commission 
of sex crimes to complete a sex offender treatment program.101 This change 
codifies California’s juvenile justice system’s existing responsibility to 
rehabilitate, educate, and punish minors who violate the law.102 
For example, in juvenile court, if a minor admits his or her guilt or becomes a 
delinquent after trial, the proceeding shifts from an adjudicatory stage to a 
dispositional stage in which the judge must determine what sentence to impose.103 
Prior to making such determinations, a juvenile court judge often uses his or her 
significant discretionary powers to order an assessment of the offender to 
determine whether the juvenile can be rehabilitated.104 The juvenile court has 
wide powers of disposition105 that are necessary to determine what should be done 
in each case for the best interests of the minor and the public.106 Chapter 919, 
however, requires juvenile court judges to prescribe sex offender treatment to 
juveniles adjudicated of sex crimes against defenseless victims regardless of 
probationary findings or the availability of sex offender treatment within the 
jurisdiction.107 While juvenile sex offenders generally reflect common 
 
99. See Waller, 467 U.S. at 49 (holding that the defendant “should not be required to prove specific 
prejudice in order to obtain relief for a violation of the public-trial guarantee”). 
100. People v. Baldwin, 142 Cal. App. 4th 1416, 1421–22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 792, 795 (3d Dist. 2006) (holding 
that information before the trial court at the time of the closure motion were the charges against the defendant 
and prosecutor’s representation that the child “was going to have difficulty testifying” was not sufficient to 
uphold the trial court decision to close the court). 
101. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 730(d) (defining sex crimes as “rape, sodomy, oral copulation, or 
an act of sexual penetration specified in Section 289 of the Penal Code”). 
102. ELLA BAKER CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, YOUR CHILD AND THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 9 (2009), 
available at http://www.pjdc.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/resource_209-Handbook-Your-Child-and-
the-Juvenile-Justice-System-Books-Not-Bars.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing the 
responsibility of rehabilitation and education that the California juvenile justice system has to offenders). 
103. See WELF. & INST. § 730 (defining the dispositional options juvenile judges may choose from). 
104. See id. §§ 702, 706 (indicating that in the order of disposition, “the court shall state the social 
study . . .  has been read and . . . considered by the court”); CAL. R. CT. 5.785 (West Supp. 2014) (specifying the 
general conduct of a dispositional hearing). 
105. WELF. & INST. § 727 (amended by Chapter 919). 
106. Youth in the Justice System: An Overview, JUVENILE L. CTR., http://www.jlc.org/news-room/media-
resources/youth-justice-system-overview (last visited July 14, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) 
(providing that the juvenile justice system offers a range of legal options to meet “both the safety needs of the 
public and treatment needs of the youth”). 
107. WELF. & INST. § 730. 
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characteristics,108 careful application of specialized treatment that will be 
effective for a juvenile is essential to success of the treatment.109 
Success under Chapter 919 relies on the availability of the various treatments 
necessary to treat the specific needs of the adjudicated juvenile.110 There is no 
one-size-fits-all type of sex offender treatment.111 Therefore, the jurisdiction in 
which a juvenile is adjudicated must have the ability to prescribe specific 
treatment that will effectively combat juvenile sex crimes.112 Without specialized 
application of sex offender treatment, the benefits of that treatment to juveniles 
will not be as meaningful.113 
Currently, few counties have juvenile sex offender programs other than those 
housed in correctional facilities.114 Chapter 919’s requirement that juveniles 
convicted of sex crimes attend sex offender treatment will require more treatment 
programs, as there are currently too few to meet this future growing need.115 It is 
unclear whether the state or counties would bear the burden of creating these new 
programs, a cost that could run upwards of millions of dollars.116 Chapter 919 
does require, however, a juvenile convicted of a sex offense to pay at least a 
portion of the sex offender treatment program’s cost.117 Chapter 919 takes a 
positive step toward the goal of sex crime prevention by coordinating essential 
sex offender education with tailored probation in the juvenile justice system.118 
V. CONCLUSION 
Chapter 919 is a direct result of the disparity between strict legal 
consequences associated with forcible rape and lesser consequences for sex 
 
108. See UNDERSTANDING JUVENILE SEXUAL OFFENDING BEHAVIOR, supra note 66, at 1–3 
(demonstrating various characteristics juvenile sex offenders share such as physical and sexual abuse and 
developmental progression). 
109. See id. at 6–7 (explaining the various factors necessary for success in sex offender treatment for 
juveniles). 
110. See id. at 10 (indicating the importance of specific treatment identification to effective treatment of 
juvenile sex offenders). 
111. Id. at 7 (outlining the various methods of sex offender treatment and warning of problems arising 
from admitting juveniles to programs that would not be effective for the offending juvenile’s particular 
situation). 
112. Id. 
113. See generally id. (outlining the positive effects of successfully and appropriately administered sex 
offender treatment). 
114. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 838, at 2 (Aug. 6, 
2014) (indicating that few counties have sex offender treatment programs). 
115. Id. 
116. Id. (pointing out the uncertainty of who is responsible for the operation cost of the required sex 
offender treatment programs). 
117. CAL. WELF & INST. CODE § 730 (amended by Chapter 919). 
118. UNDERSTANDING JUVENILE SEXUAL OFFENDING BEHAVIOR, supra note 66, at 6 (pointing out the 
positive effects of coordination between the criminal justice system and sex offender treatment providers). 
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crimes against defenseless victims.119 The law’s supporters find it “unreasonable 
and arbitrary” that a victim’s ability to resist during a sexual attack makes any 
difference in the legal characterization of the potential consequences.120 
The bill began as an attempt by the law’s supporters to incorporate sex 
crimes against defenseless victims into the more serious forcible category, along 
with requiring mandatory out-of-home placement for juveniles convicted of these 
sex crimes.121 Chapter 919 disposes of previously valuable rehabilitative tools,122 
and favors formal adjudication proceedings and required treatment.123 However, 
its final form seems to have missed the target, instead making juvenile 
proceedings resemble its adult criminal counterparts, but without the ability to 
impose similar adult punishments.124  
 
 
119. Calefati, supra note 4 (indicating the outrage that compelled supporters of the law to seek equal 
treatment for sexual assault victims regardless of whether the victim was unconscious or not). 
120. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 838, at 4 (June 17, 
2014) (“Juvenile victims of sex crime need to be protected equally, just the same as adult victims, regardless of 
why they were vulnerable to a horrible assault.”). 
121. See SB 838, 2014 Leg., 2013–2014 Sess. (Cal. 2014) (as amended on Mar. 5, 2014, but not enacted) 
(demonstrating the aggressive approach to amending the law to include sex crimes against defenseless victims 
in the same category as forcible sex crimes). 
122. Compare WELF. & INST. § 790 (allowing deferred entry of judgment of juveniles unless the 
accusation is for one of the enumerated violent crimes or forcible sex crimes, which do not include sex crimes 
against defenseless victims) with id. § 676 (amended by Chapter 919) (demonstrating that deferred entry of 
judgment is no longer available for juveniles accused of sex crimes against defenseless victims). 
123. See id. § 676 (as amended by Chapter 919) (demonstrating the prohibition of deferred entry of 
judgment, which if offered requires the juvenile to admit to all crimes listed in the petition and exhibit a 
willingness to participate in the probation). 
124. Compare id. § 676(a)(4)–(6), (b) (amended by Chapter 919) (equating a sex crime against a 
defenseless victim the same as a  forcible sex crime for  the purposes of the confidentiality of the hearing); id. § 
730 (amended by Chapter 919) (equating a sex crime against a defenseless victim the same as a forcible sex 
crime for the purposes of mandatory sex offender treatment), with id. § 602 (requiring a sex crime be committed 
using force to try the minor as an adult). 
